TWO:Nelson, who had returned to England, by the 15th of September was on board of his old flagship, the Victory, and immediately sailed for Cadiz, accompanied only by three other ships of war. On the 29th he arrived off Cadiz, and was received by the fleet with enthusiastic acclamation. It was his birthday. He posted himself about twenty leagues to the west of Cadiz, in hope that the French fleet would come out. He knew that it was in great distress for provisions, because Napoleon, intending the fleet to assemble at Brest, had laid in the necessary stores there, and could not convey them, in any reasonable time, to Cadiz. Still more, it was believed that Napoleon refused to send any supplies there, having given Villeneuve imperative orders to make his way to Brest. But it is also asserted, by French authorities, that Napoleon had ordered the Minister of Marine to take the command from Villeneuve, and that the admiral was piqued to show the Emperor, by a daring exploit, that he had done him injustice. Under these or similar motives, Villeneuve determined to sail out, and encounter the British fleet. Nelson was watching for him behind Cape St. Mary, like a cat watching a mouse, as he said in a letter to the Abb�� Campbell, of Naples, a friend of his and of Lady Hamilton's. On the 9th of October, certain that the enemy would soon come out, Nelson sent to Lord Collingwood his plan of the battle. It was to advance in two lines of sixteen ships each, with an advanced squadron of eight of the fastest-sailing two-decked ships. They were thus to break the enemy's line in three places at once. Nelson was to aim at the centre; Collingwood, leading the second line, to break through at about the twelfth ship from the rear; and the light squadron, at three or four ships from the centre��Nelson's point of attack. "I look," wrote Nelson, "with confidence to a victory before the van of the enemy can succour their rear; and then the British fleet will, most of them, be ready to receive their twenty sail of the line, or to pursue them, should they endeavour to make off. If the van of the enemy tack, the captured ships must run to the leeward of the British fleet; if the enemy wear, the British must place themselves between them and the captured and disabled British ships, and, should the enemy close, I have no fear for the result. The second in command will, in all possible things, direct the movements of his line by keeping them as compact as the nature of the circumstances will admit. Captains are to look to their particular line as their rallying-point; but, in case signals cannot be clearly seen or understood, no captain can do very wrong if he places his ship alongside that of the enemy!" Such were Nelson's general orders, and they were entirely approved by Lord Collingwood.The formidable organisation of the Roman Catholics led to a counter organisation of the Protestants, in the form of Brunswick Clubs. This organisation embraced the whole of the Protestant peasantry, north and south, the Protestant farmers, and many of the gentry. They, too, held their regular meetings, had their exciting[284] oratory, and passed strong resolutions, condemnatory of the inaction of the Government, which was charged with neglecting its first and most imperative duty��the protection of society from lawless violence. The Brunswickers, as well as the Emancipators, had their "rent" to bear the expenses of the agitation. They alleged that they were obliged to organise in self-defence, and in defence of the Constitution. In Ulster the country was divided into two camps, Catholic and Protestant. Notwithstanding the difference in numbers, the Protestants of Ulster were eager to encounter their antagonists in the field, and had not the slightest doubt of being able to beat them. They had all the proud confidence of a dominant race, and regarded the military pretensions of their antagonists as scornfully as the Turks would have regarded similar pretensions on the part of the Greeks. The feeling on both sides was such, that an aggression upon the Protestants in the south would have called forth 100,000 armed men in the north; and an aggression upon the Catholics in Ulster would have produced a similar effect among the Catholics in Munster. The number of Protestants in favour of Emancipation constituted but a small minority. The great mass were against concession. They believed that an insurrection would be the most satisfactory solution of the difficulty. With the aid of the army they felt that they were able to crush the "Papists," as they had been crushed in 1798, and then they hoped they would be quiet for at least another generation, resuming what they considered their proper position as "sole-leather." They forgot, however, the increase in their numbers, their property, and their intelligence. They forgot the growth of a middle class amongst them; the increased power and influence of the hierarchy, and the formidable band of agitators supplied by the Roman Catholic bar, whose members, many of them men of commanding abilities and large practice, were excluded by their creed from the Bench; which exclusion filled the minds of the ambitious with a burning sense of wrong, and made it their interest to devise all possible modes of evading the law, while keeping the country on the verge of insurrection.